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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
reaffirms the manifest policy of Section 59 to hold owners liable when some
one else operates these vehicles negligently, unless it is clearly and unambiguously shown that it was without their permission.
VIOLATION OF TRE BUILDING CODE AS EVIDENCE or NEGLIGENCE

In New York, a cause of action based upon common law negligence places
a burden on the plaintiff to show an absence of contributory negligence.
The State Legislature may, however, create by statute, a standard of care
or duty for the protection of a specifically designated class, the infraction of
which will be conclusive of negligence. The resultant liability attaches regardless of negligence and is recognized only when the courts find that the statute
manifests a legislative intent to that effect. Once this absolute statutory liability
32
has been determined, contributory negligence is of no consequence.
The plaintiff in Major v. Waverly and Ogden, Inc. 33 was injured in a fall
on stairs unprotected by a handrail and lacking illumination. Both deficiencies
were in violation of regulations promulgated by the State Building Commission.
The Code had been adopted by the village in which the building, an apartment
house, was situated. 34 The defendant, owner of the building, claimed that the
plaintiff, a guest of his tenant, was guilty of contributory negligence. 35 The
trial court agreed and the plaintiff, upon appeal, reiterated her allegation that
the defendant's infraction was conclusive of negligence and objected to the
trial court's instruction that it was incumbent upon her to dispel any evidence
of contributory negligence.
The regulations of the building code were promulgated by the Building
Code Commission under authorization set forth in the Executive Law. 36
The verdict for the apartment owner was unanimously upheld by the
Appellate Division 37 and the Court of Appeals. 8
The opinion considered and distinguished the case of Koenig v. Patrick
Construction Co.3a which had been cited by the plaintiff as an impelling
precedent for her contention that proof of a violation of the Building Code was
itself conclusive evidence of negligence.
That case held that a failure by an employer to provide safety devices for
the injured employee in contravention of specific requirements of the Labor Law,
made the infraction subject to an absolute statutory liability. The language
32. Koenig v. Patrick Construction Corp., 298 N.Y. 313, 83 N.E.2d 133 (1948).
33.

7 N.Y.2d 332, 197 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1960).

39.

Supra note 32.

34. Once adopted by the political subdivisions, the Code took the effect of law therein
and amendments, additions and revisions by the State Building Commission were automatically incorporated into the local ordinance.
35. The plaintiff was visiting at a friend's apartment in the defendant's building and
was watching television in the otherwise darkened livingroom. She rushed to find the bathroom, opened the wrong door and fell down the unlit stairs.
36. N.Y. Executive Law § 374-a.
37. 8 A.D.2d 380, 190 N.Y.2d 526 (2d Dep't 1959).
38. Supra note 33.
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of that statute set forth an unmistakable legislative intent to give the employee
a degree of protection greater than that provided by the common law. Present
in that statute, however, was a clearly defined class engaged in a hazardous
calling who were intended to be protected by a fiat and an unvarying duty
directed to their employers.
No similar legislative intent was apparent to this Court in its reading of
the Executive Law. No well defined class was to be particularly protected from
any specific hazard which might cause injury. On the contrary, the Court
found unequivocal language suggesting that the Executive Law was enacted
to protect the people of the State in general. 40 It empowered the Building Code
Commission to draw up basic and uniform performance standards to alleviate
the hardship caused by obsolete, conflicting, unnecessarily complex and costly
local standards for building construction. Reference in the Executive Law
to reasonable standards for the protection of occupants and users were only
incidental to the paramount purposes therein.
The Court looked for express or implied language which would show a
legislative intent in the Executive Law to create a greater liability than the
common law concept of negligence. 41 It found no such intent therein and would
not presuppose it 6f the Legislature to abrogate the common law in the absence
of a crystal clear statutory expression that so far-reaching a result should
follow.
The Court noted that such a ready construction would soon jeopardize
the whole common law concept of negligence in this State by making other
statutes providing standards of care prone to the same loose construction.
A second reason was given by the Court in refusing to find a liability
predicated solely on a violation of the Code. The rules of the Building Code
were subject to modification, repeal or amendment by the Commission and were
binding only by virtue of the original adoption of the Code by local ordinance.
The common law can be changed only by the State Legislature and not
by the whim of a subordinate political sub-division. The Commission can
amend and repeal the standards, emanating from its powers under the Code,
but it can not reasonably be concluded that an administrative body could
achieve, in their quasi-legislative capacity, that which heretofore could be done
only through substantive law-making by the Legislature. Such a proposition
would be untenable because the Constitution reserves that power to the State
Legislature. 42
Therefore, to hold that a violation of the regulations of the Code in the
instant case was conclusive of negligence would be to assume that the Com40. N.Y. Executive Law § 370:
the health, safety, welfare, comfort and security of the people of the state
The purposes set forth in § 370 are followed closely in the standards provided in
§ 375(3) and (5).
41. Sheppard Co. v. Zachary P. Taylor Pub. Co., 234 N.Y. 465, 138 N.E. 409 (1923).
42. Shumer v. Caplin, 241 N.Y. 346, 150 N.E. 139 (1925).

230

COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
mission by its regulations can create statutory liability. For this reason, the
violation of the Building Code was only held to be some evidence of negligence. 43
USE OF NEWS ARTICLE FOR ADVERTISING PURPOSES AS VIOLATIVE

OF RIGHT OF PRIVACY

The Mosler Safe Company, for the purpose of promoting the sale of its
safes, distributed handbills by mail to prospective customers. In order to
dramatize the danger in not being equipped with one of these safes, a newspaper account of a destructive fire, including a newsphoto of the flaming building, was reproduced in the handbill. Also included, but separate from the
reprinted article, were a few lines of advertising. The description of the fire
mentioned the plaintiff by name three times, along with his address and occupation. It was implied that the fire was started through the carelessness of
plaintiff and his companion. Because of this unauthorized use of his name,
Flores brought an action in libel and for an invasion of his right of privacy
under Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. The defendant's motion
to dismiss the latter cause of action was overruled in the trial court and this
was affirmed by the Appellate Division." The Court of Appeals, in Flores v.
Mosler Safe Company,45 also affirmed, holding that the complaint did not, as
a matter of law, fail to set forth a use of plaintiff's name which was violative
of his statutory right of privacy.
The development of the right of privacy is usually traced back to a law
review article written in 1890.46 The right is based on a person's privilege "to
be let alone," and grants recovery for the embarrassment and indignation
experienced by one whose private affairs are revealed to the public. The first
case in which this right was contended for was Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co.47 The New York Court of Appeals therein held, in a decision still
controlling, that there exisis no common law right of privacy in New York.
Chief Justice Parker wrote in the opinion: "The legislative body could very
well interfere and arbitrarily provide that no one should be permitted for his
own selfish purpose to use the picture or the name of another for advertising
purposes without his consent."4 8 The Legislature in its very next session passed
what are now Sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law. Section 50
provides that "A person . . . that uses for advertising or for the *purposes of
trade, the name . . . of any living person without having first obtained the
written permission of such person . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor." Section 51
provides for injunctive relief and damages. It should be noted that the right
43. Ibid.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Flores v. Mosler Safe Company, 7 A.D.2d 226, 182 N.YS.2d 126 (3d Dep't 1959).
7 N.Y.2d 276, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1959).
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
Id. at 545, 64 N.E. 443.

